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Abstract: To leverage proactive context-aware services for mobile handsets, an 
architecture for the management, aggregation and distribution of information is 
required. This work presents a framework that has been developed to realize an 
extensible infrastructure in which personal information can be shared with others 
while on the go. Access control mechanisms restrict the distribution of data based on 
social relationships and the validity of context conditions. 
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1 Introduction 
The future of mobile services is meant to be context-aware. Context-aware services have long 
been seen as the natural advancement of location-based services, which were introduced more 
than five years ago. At last, today’s mobile handsets are offering various features that place 
this progress within reach, being equipped with various sensors, sufficiently powerful 
computing resources and the possibility to manage all kinds of personal information. And yet, 
their most important asset may be their omnipresence. This circumstance quickens the interest 
in intelligent services, designed to adapt to the user’s current situation. Here, a framework for 
context aggregation is needed to manage the distribution and combination of information from 
various sources.  
Our context management framework (CMF) builds on initial work [1] accomplished within 
the IST-project MobiLife1 [2]. Today, the CMF represents an open network of distributed and 
highly interconnected components to gather, aggregate and further exchange context 
information proactively. It enables the transformation of quantitative context information into 
qualitative statements about a user’s given situation. Share whatever you like reflects some of 
the CMF’s main requirements on context distribution and access control. Sharing personal 
memories and experiences clearly involves a number of privacy issues that need to be carefully 
considered from the start. The CMF architecture tackles these constraints without 
compromising its open and extensible nature. IYOUIT2 is the reference implementation of the 
CMF and comes as a mobile client that allows users to share personal information while on the 
go and a Web-based portal to stay in touch with the online community. IYOUIT’s mobile 
client runs on most Nokia Series 60 smartphones and succeeds its predecessor ContextWatcher 
[3][4] by adding authentication and privacy protection mechanisms as well as lifting its system 
architecture to a flexible, broker-centric one. The general aim is to make it easy for an end-user 
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to automatically record, store, and use context information, e.g. for personalization purposes, 
as input parameter to information services or simply to share this information with others. 
The process of enriching gathered context data to qualitative information is exemplified in 
Section II. In Section III an overview of the underlying system architecture is provided and 
insights into several core components as well as the applied delegation-based authentication 
mechanism is given. Access control mechanisms are discussed in Section IV, focusing on the 
actual directive management, context filtering and the subsequent verification of the latter. 
IYOUIT is described in detail in Section V and related work in the field of context-aware 
systems, access control mechanisms and their applications is described in Section VI. 
Concluding remarks can be found in Section VII. 
2 Context Aggregation 
The main objective of the CMF is to allow for developing context-aware (mobile) applications 
that gather context data from various sources. Raw context data, e.g. sensor outputs like the 
currently visible cell ID on a mobile phone do often not provide meaningful (human 
understandable) information right away. Instead, the aggregation of such context data and the 
subsequent combination with other pieces of information is regarded as an essential process to 
enable the development of intelligent applications that make sense of the user’s surrounding. 
Figure 1 illustrates a simplified context aggregation to resolve a user’s current location and to 




The cell ID obtained from the mobile phone is transmitted to the LocationProvider, a 
networked CMF component, to be resolved into an actual address record. It stores all recorded 
location traces and applies clustering techniques to identify frequently visited places of the 
user, e.g. his home or office [5], while remaining independent of any concrete mobile network 
infrastructure. This simplified example already implies the need for a context management 
infrastructure to also facilitate authentication, access control, easy extensibility as well as the 
combination of and the reasoning about different context information. 
3 System Architecture 
The CMF has been designed as an open, distributed and extensible framework to allow other 
parties to join the network and to enrich existing services for mobile handsets. Only a minimal 
set of components is regarded as being owned by the network operator and may have access to 
the users’ credentials. Access control and authentication techniques allow for integrating 
Address, 
Place 

















4 / 13 Volume 11 (2008) 
external partners or data sources without the threat of malicious data abuse. To do so, several 
essential requirements of the CMF were identified.  
Instant revocation: The user as well as the network operator needs to have the ability to 
revoke access rights to context information at any time from certain components or distinct 
users.  
Secure authorization and delegation: The user’s credentials (his unique identifier and 
personal password) should not be propagated among uncontrolled components to prevent un-
trusted components from collecting personal information on behalf of the user without his 
explicit permission.  
Abstraction and enrichment of context: Historic context information is stored within the 
respective component to allow for clustering and further data mining to abstract from lower 
level data, as exemplified in Figure 1. 
Proactive requests: The user himself must not explicitly trigger the actual context retrieval. 
In addition, for answering a given context request, the number of components concerned 
cannot be predetermined. Computations on gathered context information to gain more 
qualitative information may require several components to autonomously request context from 
other components.  
In general, the CMF architecture can be conceptually categorized in several groups of 
components that serve a distinct purpose. ContextConsumers mainly retrieve context 
information from various sources, the ContextBroker and the ContextHarvester provide means 
of easy context lookup and context gathering, whereas ContextProviders (CP) aggregate 
contextual data to provide meaningful information for specific services. Three management 
components are major constituent parts of the CMF to allocate basic functionalities that all 
components within the framework rely on. All other components that can be subsumed in a 
group of 3rd party applications act as external data source and may also provide additional 
context visualization techniques. 
A. Management Components 
The IdentityManager maintains the list of all registered entities (components and users), 
represented by uniquely named principles (appID and entityID). Each context retrieval request 
within the CMF is authorized by this central component to bar single components from 
collecting and distributing highly sensitive data without explicit permission. Therefore we 
introduced an authentication scheme based on ticket verification, similar to the Kerberos 
approach [6], to allow 3rd party integration without the need to disclose the users’ credentials to 
each component within the framework. This authentication scheme is described in more detail 
in Figure 3, by means of a common context retrieval request.    
The RelationManager enables the representation and exchange of qualitative social data. 
Explicit facts about social relationships between users (e.g. family members, friends or 
colleagues) are combined with the world knowledge encoded in an ontological model in order 
to apply logic based reasoning. These reasoning mechanisms ensure the consistency of the 
social data and allow for knowledge discovery techniques to complement the social network. 
As a result, groups of users can be formed dynamically, based on qualitative relationships 
managed by the RelationManager, further discussed in [7]. Explicit or implicit social 
connections are made available for other CPs to further enrich their context information.  
Apart from a subject and object entity as well as the actual relation predicate, each relationship 
definition has additional attributes. The status of a relationship, for instance, describes if a 
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relation has been requested (the initial value for all relations suggested by the user), approved 
(which means the object entity has already confirmed) or inferred, indicating that this relation 
has been deduced. The complete set of relationships, including deduced relations, is stored 
within a database to reduce query response times. Since the majority of requests are concerned 
with retrieving information rather than modifying data, the underlying knowledge base does 
not need to be involved. However, in case the set of approved relations has changed, either by 
adding a new relation or removing an existing one, all active relationships are transmitted to 
the inference engine to trigger the reasoning process. To model these qualitative social 
relationships we developed an ontology, specifically designed as a social knowledge base for 
the CMF. In contrast to most social networking services that only differentiate between buddy 
– or friendships, the social ontology with its 50 defined relationships allows for very detailed 
descriptions of all kinds of social connections between the users of the framework. 
For providing personalized (mobile) services and applications, access control is always an 
issue that needs to be considered. The PrivacyManager (PM) enables the definition of relation 
and context-based access control directives to ease the process of managing ones personal 
directives. Our approach ensures both, the users’ demand for privacy control and ease of use. 
Therefore directives do not have to be bound to concrete implementations or services in the 
framework but to abstract, general concepts of context. The user thus specifies a certain level 
of detail to be revealed per context category, without knowing which components are 
concerned with the actual execution and filtering of data. Social relationships allow for 
defining simple group access directives to restrict the distribution of context information. For 
instance, the user may specify that colleagues should only know the current city, whereas 
family members are granted access to the detailed set of location information, e.g. up to the 
street level. Further details on the proposed access control management can be found in 
Section IV. 
B. Context-Broker, -Harvester, -Consumer and -Provider 
The ContextBroker and the ContextHarvester provide access to a repository of system 
elements on the level of CPs (in the case of the ContextBroker) or on the level of context 
elements (in case of the ContextHarvester). The ContextBroker implements a registration and 
lookup service to enable the discovery of various CPs, based on the schema provided within 
the CP advertisement. The ContextHarvester can be seen as a specialized CP that collects 
context information across a range of other CPs. In supporting both, collections of context 
types and collections of entities, it can be used to obtain heterogeneous context information for 
various users or it may be used to obtain all personal information of a specific entity no matter 
where the information is stored or managed physically. 
The majority of components within the framework surely belong to the category of CPs. At 
the time of writing more than ten CPs have been developed to provide services like local 
weather forecasts, picture sharing facilities or sound recording, to name only a few. In 
principle, a CP first gathers a certain type of information (e.g. the user’s cell-id) from a sensor 
(for instance the mobile handset) or another CP to further process and enrich this information. 
This procedure of context aggregation is taking place within each CP and is essentially 
required for the subsequent (logical) combination of different context elements that, as a 
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C. Basic Datatypes  
Context aggregation and the later 
context combination across 
components is one important 
utilization of the CMF. Therefore 
numerous datatypes have been defined 
to leverage the exchange and 
assessment of context data within the 
framework.   
Context Element: A context element 
is an elementary piece of context 
information that encapsulates the 
information obtained from a CP. A 
context element must at least include the CP’s unique ID, an identifier of the owner of the 
respective piece of information as well as a number of parameters that hold the actual data 
values. Figure 2 shows a context element as rendered in XML. 
Parameter: A parameter object contains a name, a timestamp, a corresponding value and an 
extensible list of attributes further categorizing the parameter value (including the ontology 
reference and accuracy). 
Context Query: A context query request 
allows for retrieving distinct context 
elements that comply with certain constraints 
on the contents of context elements. The 
context query object contains a filter 
specified by simple and complex conditions. 
Simple conditions specify a comparison 
operator on values and attributes to select 
distinct parameters of interest, while 
complex conditions combine simple 
conditions recursively via logical operators. 
Applying a projection or summary operation 
further restricts the result set. 
ContextProvider Advertisement: The 
advertisement includes a CP’s unique id and 
a base URL to this service. Furthermore, it 
provides the data scheme in the form of a 
parameter hierarchy and a list of all featuring 
entities as well as options. Each parameter 
has been assigned a certain privacy level that 
indicates the sensitivity of the data and 
additional attributes such as the type or the 
unit of measurement. Since each CP may also provide software packages for the mobile client 
to make use of its public interface, the clientSoftware object indicates the availability of such 
software components. As soon as the mobile client has been identified and all constraints on 
downloading the package are fulfilled (e.g. the client’s platform or version number), the client 
software can be delivered or updated. 
 
Figure 3: Context retrieval sequence diagram 
Figure 2: Context element 
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D. Authentication and Component Interaction 
To realize an open, distributed infrastructure and to allow 3rd parties to provide their own 
applications on top of the CMF’s core infrastructure, a corresponding authentication 
mechanism needs to be in place. Two assumptions need to be considered that characterize 
some basic principles of how context is distributed and exchanged in a standard request-reply 
pattern, protected by common encryption techniques like https. All components that are not 
regarded as being controlled by the network operator (and thus entirely comply to the 
specification) are trusted in the sense that mandatory authentication and privacy mechanisms 
need to be implemented. Components that violate these constraints, be it on purpose or due to 
implementation flaws, are regarded as un-trusted. Furthermore, all communication paths need 
to be secure so that no request or reply messages could be intercepted and decrypted. In 
principle, two different types of authentication methods are applied within the CMF: user and 
application authentication. The request ticket that needs to be issued together with the actual 
context query is of the following form: <entityID,appID,entityToken,appToken>. 
It includes an entityID, the requesting appID as well as two tokens. The entityID and the 
entityToken are used for the user authentication to ensure that applications retrieving context 
on behalf of the user are only granted access to those pieces of information the user is allowed 
to see. This means that for each entity and each application (aka CP), a corresponding 
entityToken exists. This token is issued by the IdentityManager (in case valid application 
credentials are given) and needs to be verified on each request as illustrated in Figure 3. 
Besides, the application authentication controls inter-component communication and requires a 
valid appID and appToken. So, for each combination of ContextConsumer and CP, a 
corresponding appToken exists, again issued and verified by the IM. All tokens are valid as 
long as either the user or the network operator revokes former access rights to any context 
retrieval on behalf of the user or disallows any component interaction. Instant revocation is 
given, since all context requests are explicitly authorized by the IdentityManager. Once the 
provided request ticket has been verified, the CP retrieves all appropriate access control 
directives from the PrivacyManager. 
4 Access Control 
The data flow in-between services or components allows for much richer services that build up 
on the knowledge made available. However, the network operator needs to be able to control 
the data flow in order to prevent others from unchecked data storage and general data abuse. In 
addition, the users themselves should be able to mark certain applications as trusted or 
disallow access to personal information for unknown or unwished service providers as well as 
other users. The proposed access control mechanisms are based on the social relationships 
managed by the RelationManager and the subsequent logical combination with other context 
data. In principle, three types of access control directives can be identified. Directives can 
either be defined for concrete users, groups of users (based on explicit or implicit social 
relationships) or certain context conditions. So besides role-based access control directives that 
build upon a social network of users and the underlying ontological model, context-dependent 
directives allow for directives that are bound to concrete context conditions (abstract 
descriptions of the user’s surrounding). These conditions can be assigned to certain access 
control directives in order to restrict the validity of directives to concrete situations. Context-
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current context of a user are fulfilled. For instance, access to a business schedule may only be 
granted to colleagues that are nearby, but only during office hours. In this case, context 
information is actually the prime condition for deciding about access to, again, context 
information. To further refine the type of information that is made available, we differentiate 
between various granularities of context data with respect to their up-to-dateness. This means 
that a user could forbid access to the last known context state (e.g. the current location), but 
grants access to older or “out-dated” and therefore less critical information. The other way 
round, granting access to only the latest information, and therefore concealing the context 
history, prevents others from exploring issued data to analyze certain user behaviors. 
The privacy decision point is realized in distributed components – the PrivacyManager 
(PM) and all concerned CPs. The actual filtering of context information according to the 
directives (specified by the user) has to be accomplished by each CP. Policy compliance 
according to the given access control directives is warranted because each component that 
processes a user’s context information must be granted access by the user and authorized by 
the IdentityManager. Hence, the filtering of context information (see Figure 3) is accomplished 
by the respective component that knows the structure and the semantics of the data. Even 
though it would be in principle possible to establish a policy enforcement mechanism for 
access control in a thoroughly trusted environment, this was never our original intention. 
Instead, the CMF has been designed as a distributed, extensible framework that does provide 
certain means to verify the applied context filtering.  
A. Directive Management 
Access control directives are defined by concrete context specifications, a subject entity, an 
object entity or a certain relation predicate and the actual privacy level. The privacy level 
defines to what extend a certain type of context will be made available. A seven-staged 
granularity allows for fine-grained access control directives, ranging from no access to full 
access. The context specification contains a unique identifier, a CP’s base URL, the parameter 
path, an entity’s ID and an ontology reference (optional). However, the user does not have to 
provide a specific CP ID or parameter path as part of the request. General user-defined 
directives are automatically translated into concrete context specifications. To give an 
example, adding an access control directive to prevent disclosing one’s current whereabouts, 
the PM first retrieves all appropriate CP advertisements from the ContextBroker that provide 
at least some spatial context information and computes all concrete parameter paths for the 
appropriate CPs. 
The usage of context dependencies is restricted to non-dependent context data, which means 
that the validation of this condition must be directly answered by the corresponding CP. To do 
so, the PM gathers all context info exclusively via a specified interface (getContext()) of the 
appropriate CP since all context dependencies are modeled as context queries. Therefore, each 
CP has to implement this interface so that no additional requests to other CPs are needed to 
compute the last known state. In principle, this would result in a loop, since each CP would, in 
turn, have to consult the PM again. To break the resulting loop, a CP is able to detect a request 
that has been issued by the PM by its unique appID and the corresponding appToken. As 
highlighted in Figure 3, the normal authentication scheme requires two distinct requests to the 
IdentityManager. The first check authenticates the original request from a generic 
ContextConsumer to the CP, the second time the request from the PM to the CP is verified. In 
order to prevent the second authentication request, the IdentityManager automatically verifies 
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if the CP may also have access to the PM and eventually computes a secret token. This token 
is then passed to the PM to be verified in order to retrieve the appropriate access control 
directives. 
Since a service infrastructure like the CMF undergoes frequent updates in terms of new 
services being introduced or existing services being modified, all existing access control 
directives must be adjusted dynamically. Once the ContextBroker has registered an update, the 
PM automatically verifies established directives and applies the corresponding modifications. 
In case a specific access control directive has been requested that has not been explicitly 
defined by the user, a more general directive will be returned that covers the given constraints. 
Similarly, requesting a directive for a specific entity might result in a directive that has been 
defined for a certain relationship, if the requested entity is the role-filler of that relationship. 
Also, the hierarchy of social relationships is considered, as represented within the social 
ontology. So, if no specific directive is given for the wife relationship, more general directives 
defined for all family members are returned. 
B. User Interaction 
The PrivacyManager is regarded as a controlled component, which means that only the user 
may modify access control directives. Applications (e.g. other CPs) may only retrieve 
directives that are concerned with their verified appID. To support the user in managing 
personal directives, a management interface has been developed and integrated into IYOUIT’s 
Internet portal. 
Web-based User Interface: This interface integrates most access control and social 
networking features into one compact and easy to use matrix-like interface, shown in Figure 4. 
Its principle design has been inspired by 
Almer’s work on access control 
visualization techniques [9] during the 
MobiLife project. In general, two main 
views on access control directives can be 
distinguished. The BuddyView lists all 
approved contacts on the horizontal axis 
and the main context types on the vertical 
axis. Similarly, the RelationView allows 
for defining group directives and 
therefore shows all supported 
relationships in the horizontal menu. In 
case a certain context type on the left 
hand side is highlighted, more specific 
directives exist that can be revealed by 
clicking on the respective parameter, as 
shown in Figure 4 for the context type 
weather and its sub-parameter 
weather/location.  
   Each main category of context information has its own symbol, whose actual size indicates 
the respective context level assigned and therefore the amount of data revealed. So, defining 
access control directives for the most common context types is a matter of clicking through the 
respective icon sizes with hardly any effort. The controls on the right hand side provide filter 
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for the current view, e.g. to show only directives for a certain access level, to add distinct sub-
categories of interest and to save or discard changes. Since access control directives can 
potentially overlap, the PM has to compute the most specific directive. For instance, having 
defined directives for all friends but also for one of your friends in particular would result in at 
least two overlapping directives (in this example the directive that has been assigned to this 
particular person would hold). Within the PM web interface, all directives that have been 
derived from other facts are shown in grayscale, whereas colored icons represent explicit 
definitions for concrete buddies. 
Context Mirror: With the so-called context mirror, the user is able to verify the compliance 
with the given access control directives by inspecting (his own) personal data through the 
eye’s of someone else. This way, directives can be revised and access to context can be 
withdrawn from applications that do not apply the filtering of data according to the directives. 
The context mirror is reflected in a Boolean value in the functional interface of a CP and an 
observer’s entity ID, found in all context elements. Whenever the context mirror is enabled, 
the corresponding access control directives are retrieved from the PM and subsequently 
applied to the user’s own context within the respective CP. The application of the context 
mirror within IYOUIT is described in the next Section. 
5 Mobile Client Application 
IYOUIT is a research prototype that represents our prime implementation of the CMF to apply 
context-aware technologies and methodologies in practice (including ontology-based 
reasoning and access control techniques). In 
short, IYOUIT facilitates the following usage 
scenarios:  
   Real time context sharing for the exchange 
of qualitative information to keep track of 
friends and family members in an 
unobtrusive manner.   
   Contextual tagging of user generated media 
to describe the current context, to add 
automatically generated titles as well as 
descriptions to pictures, maps and sounds.  
   Storage and simplified retrieval of context 
data. Different views and context 
visualization techniques assist the user in 
finding useful information.  
   IYOUIT is a tab-based application, in 
which each tab either displays a certain type 
of context information or accumulates 
various pieces of information in a context 
overview. The Me-tab is IYOUIT’s standard 
entry point and highlights all recently 
collected information. Clicking on one of the 
entries, a more detailed view is provided 
within the respective tab. The Buddy tab is 
the central place for all real-time context Figure 5: IYOUIT's buddy tab 
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information of approved buddies, including their current whereabouts, latest activities, shared 
photos and so on. Different views on context, various sorting orders and context-dependent ad-
hoc groups help finding interesting or newly gathered information, as illustrated in the upper 
half of Figure 5. So besides grouping buddies with similar context (e.g. the same city or 
weather condition), the Friends of friends group lists all IYOUIT users that have been deduced 
as a rather close contact without being explicitly added by the user. This is a direct result of the 
applied social reasoning by the RelationManager, to support the user in completing his 
personal network of social contacts. Also part of the Buddy tab, the context mirror 
functionality has been implemented to verify the context filtering that has been applied in the 
respective CPs. Once the context mirror has been enabled (see lower screenshots in Figure 5), 
different views on your own context are displayed to reflect the way buddies see one’s 
personal data. In general, IYOUIT is capable of sensing, aggregating, combining and 
distributing various types of context. Amongst others, this includes the user’s location, photos, 
local weather data, nearby buddies or devices as well as personal experiences. Here, especially 
the way spatial data is processed can be taken as an example for the context aggregation that is 
taking place in the CMF. The location estimation can either be based on raw GPS coordinates, 
currently visible cell IDs or triangulation. The final step in the process of spatial aggregation is 
the application of a location-clustering algorithm to automatically detect frequently visited 
places [5]. Those places can be labeled as “Home” or “Office” and linked to a concept within 
the spatial ontology. Those places of interest have a qualitative meaning that allows others to 
easily classify this information. 
6 Related Work 
Several computing infrastructures for managing context have been proposed to support the 
rapid development of context-aware applications. All approaches generally provide a suitable 
abstraction mechanism to separate the process of context gathering and distribution from the 
core application logic. The Context Toolkit (CT) [10] is a prominent server-based platform, 
which uses XML structures to represent contextual data and to hide sensor details. A query and 
notification interface provides a standardized access to the data. Context providers and 
interpreters store historic context information and serve as a context abstraction layer. Context 
harvesters combine context information as well as repositories of services and components that 
are currently available within the system. Even though, in principle similar to our approach, 
the CT system only provides basic access control mechanisms for privacy protection. Foreseen 
as one potential solution, context-dependent privacy rules are mentioned, without giving any 
more details. Likewise, CT’s use of standard public-private key technology for authentication 
does not allow for instantly revoking access rights in combination with delegation. In contrast 
to the closed CT system, our target is to create an open context infrastructure as also proposed 
in [11] to securely integrate external components using delegated credentials. Therefore, usage 
control [12] generally seems to conflict with our main aim to allow for further processing of 
context within trusted, external components. The aggregation and the logical combination of 
context is one of the main principles of the CMF to realize context-aware services.  
Another related approach in terms of shifting resource intensive context manipulations from 
the mobile device to a service-oriented infrastructure is realized in the Context Distribution 
Framework (CDF) [13]. Similar to our parameter structure, a hierarchical representation of 
data elements is proposed to enable quality of context annotations. Furthermore, the CDF 
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level data. However, this approach implicates severe scalability issues for expressive ontology 
languages if applied as the main representation format [14]. Our attempt in making use of 
ontology technologies is considerably different. Distinct higher-level data elements are 
annotated with ontology references, making them available for further ontology reasoning. 
This way, the overall scalability is not affected, while at the same time valuable reasoning 
results can be achieved. Besides, the CDF does not address suitable mechanisms for privacy 
protection in its current version. The question whether or not the CDF can be regarded as a 
closed or extensible service infrastructure remains unclear, since no details on authentication 
are given. 
A context-driven evaluation of policies that describe the behavior of agents in a pervasive 
computing environment is described in [15]. Similar to our context-dependent access control 
directives, context changes trigger the actual evaluation process of agent permissions. All 
policies are formalized in the Web Ontology Language (OWL) and consist of a context 
condition and a corresponding action. These policies do not allow for the specification of a 
subject, since policies are meant to be associated with context rather than subjects. Even 
though this assumption is legitimate in a pervasive environment where interacting components 
are unknown, our application area is different in this respect. Being able to identify 
components and users within the CMF is an axiomatic prerequisite. Therefore, we consider 
context in addition to subjects as attributes within our access control directives.  
In [16], the authors focus on the exchange of spatial information and emphasize the 
distributed nature of access control when multiple context sources with different granularities 
are present. Access to location information is based on a concept called service trust. Trusted 
components may receive information only in case an authorized request has been forwarded 
and are thus required to sign all data returned to realize non-repudiation. However, it remains 
unclear how misbehaving services can actually be identified by an entity in practice.  
Most context-aware mobile applications available today have a strong focus on uploading 
photos, including ZoneTag [17], Merkitys-Meaning3 or Shozu [18]. Categorizing photos and 
other media content on the mobile handset is typically achieved by letting the user tag those 
items. Tag sharing or tag suggestions (as offered by Zonetag) simplify this otherwise rather 
time-consuming and solely manual process. However, in terms of automatically adding tags, 
titles and descriptions to any user-generated content (including photos) based on the current 
context (not just the user’s location), IYOUIT is much more flexible and capable. Jaiku4, 
which has recently been acquired by Google, is a mobile application with a similar approach 
compared to IYOUIT in sharing presence information with others. Through its connection to 
Twitter, a popular location-based micro blogging site, Jaiku became one of the most prominent 
mobile clients. With IYOUIT and the underlying CMF, our approach is to allow users to share 
personal information without the need to enter data manually, but to automatically sense, 
gather and process this information. 
7 Conclusion 
Initial usage statistics recorded during the 9 months development time and experiences that we 
made with the former ContextWatcher community point out the interconnected and lively 
nature of our system. Up to now, our 35 test users sent more than 250.000 location update 
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requests (on average one every 15 mins), took 2300 photos, visited over 2000 cities in 23 
countries and updated their local weather forecast about 3500 times. Based on those initial 
trials, the implementation of the CMF specification proved feasible in terms of scalability and 
practicability for managing context in a distributed architecture. More profound performance 
evaluations will follow as soon as a critical mass of users has been reached with the IYOUIT 
community. Focusing on access control and authentication to meet our users’ obligations in 
terms of privacy protection without compromising the CMF’s overall extensibility through the 
integration of 3rd party applications was deemed necessary but clearly entailed the complexity 
of the overall system architecture. However, shifting expensive tasks and complex 
computations to server components in the network made it possible to realize a lightweight 
mobile client on the one hand, and rich services centered on qualitative context information on 
the other hand.  The aggregation and meaningful combination of context from various sources 
through lower-level clustering or higher-level reasoning techniques can only be accomplished 
with high-performance computing resources as provided by server components in the network 
layer. IYOUIT and the CMF architecture will be constantly enhanced with new components 
and services to underline IYOUIT’s living test-bed character and to further verify research 
results with real context information. After all, sharing personal information in general and 
qualitative context information in particular is fun and helps you keeping track of your 
buddies. Share whatever you like, but only what you would like to share – with IYOUIT. 
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